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THE BUBBLE CONCEPT IN WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Clean Water Act (CWA)' "to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation's waters."2
The Act authorizes the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to estab-
lish and enforce restrictions on the amount of pollutant material 3 that any
source of pollution may lawfully discharge into receiving waters.4 Al-
though it is not blind to economic constraints, the Act requires affected
industries to make a substantial investment in the development and appli-
cation of innovative methods of pollution control.5 The Act balances
environmental and economic concerns by prescribing several different
technology-based pollution control standards such as the "best practicable
control technology" (BPT),n and the "best available technology econom-
ically achievable" (BAT).' The EPA must translate these general stan-
dards into numerical "effluent limitations" applicable to all "point
sources" of pollution." The EPA currently applies effluent limitations to
each discrete outfall of water pollution. 9 Concern over the high cost of
33'U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976 & Supp. II 1978). Federal law in this area reached its
present form through numerous amendments to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155 (1948). The most recent amendments were passed in October of 1972,
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 896;
and in 1977, Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-217, 91 Stat. 1566. The term "Clean
Water Act" technically refers only to the 1977 Amendments but is commonly used to
describe the entire Federal Water Pollution Control Act; this Note will therefore use the
term in that broader sense.
2 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (1976). See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 242 (4th
Cir. 1979); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d 1369, 1373 (D.C.
Cir. 1977); American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1026 (10th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977); American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442, 444 (7th Cir. 1975).
3 Pollutant material regulated by the EPA under federal water pollution legislation in-
cludes both pollutants, such as flouride, and pollutant characteristics, such as oxygen de-
mand or pH. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-460 (1979).
4 See E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 126-36 (1977) (holding that
§ 301 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act authorized the EPA to set effluent lim-
itations by regulation).
' See, e.g., FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 979 (4th Cir. 1976). The legislative history
refers to the Act as a "mandate to press technology." S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 42
(1971), reprinted in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY DIVISION OF THE CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH
SERVICE OF THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, at 1460 [hereinafter cited as LEGIS. HIST.], and in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3668, 3708-09.
6 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976).
7 Id. at § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (Supp. I 1978). See text accompanying notes 35-39 infra.
1 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(e) (1976). See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112,
126-36 (1977). There are several different meanings that could be attributed to the term
"point source." The statutory definition, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14), and its varying possible
glosses, will be considered in Part IV(A) of this Note. See text accompanying notes 59-73
infra.
See Environmental Protection Agency Memoranda on Application of 'Bubble' Concept to Water
Pollution Control, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1659, 1662 (1979) [hereinafter cited as EPA Memo-
randa].
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this method of pollution control has generated a new regulatory
concept-the "bubble policy." Under a bubble concept, entire industrial
processes or plants, rather than the individual pipes and outlets contained
within them, would be directly subject to the EPA's regulations. Effluent
limitations would apply only to the aggregate discharge of each pollutant
from all outfalls within a plant. The total amount of each pollutant
introduced into a body of water would remain the same, but plant
operators would be free, within a plant, to arrange a mix of control
techniques. Thus, they could offset large discharges of a pollutant from
an outfall that is costly to control with small discharges from outfalls that
are more cost-effective to control. 10
The EPA has endorsed several versions of a bubble policy in its regula-
tions under the Clean Air Act." It has considered adopting a bubble
policy for water pollution control, but has not yet done so.' 2 Supporters of
the bubble concept praise it as a means to achieve more cost-effective
pollution control. 3 Others foresee difficulties in enforcement and a pos-
sible loss of momentum in environmental progress. Opponents also ques-
tion the legality of the bubble policy under the Act.' 4
This Note concludes that neither the language nor the general design
of the Clean Water Act prevents the EPA from adopting a bubble policy.
It suggests that such a policy could be useful in furthering the overall
goals of the CWA if it is carefully implemented and accompanied by the
necessary safeguards.
II. HISTORY AND PROVISIONS OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT
A. Water Pollution Control Prior to 1972
Before 1972, the states assumed primary responsibility for water pollu-
tion control. The Water Quality Act of 1965'1 required states to establish
10 See Comment, EPA's Widening Embrace of the "Bubble" Concept: The Legality and Availability of
Intra-Source Trade-Offs, 9 ENVT'L L. REP. (ENV-r'L L. INST.) 10,027, 10,027 (1979); EPA
Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1659. Polluters would be required to limit bubble trade-offs to
comparable pollutants. See id. at 1659-64.
" See notes 56 & 64 infra.
12 The preamble to the EPA's 1979 permit regulations states that
[S]ome commentators favored the use of an alternative effluent limitation approach for
calculating permit limits. The approach described ... was: (1) Determine a total tech-
nology-based effluent limitation for the entire plant and (2) relocate [sic] this total
discharge among the outfalls, as long as the plant continues to meet the overall technol-
ogy-based requirement. EPA is still evaluating this proposal. Should it prove appropri-
ate within the constraints of the Act, EPA may adopt this alternative approach in future
rulemaking.
44 Fed. Reg. 32,864 (1979).
13 See, e.g., EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1659-60, 1662-63; Enforcement of Environmen-
tal Regulations, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Environmental Pollution of the Comm. on Envi-
ronment and Public Works, U.S. Senate, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 106-07 (1979) (testimony of
Richard F. Schubert) thereinafter cited as Hearings].
14 See, e.g., EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1660-62, 1663; Hearings, supra note 13, at
166 (letter of Sen. Muskie).
"5 Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (1965).
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water quality goals and plans to implement them, subject to federal
approval.' 6 If state standards were not submitted or were disapproved,
the national government could initiate a lengthy conference procedure
leading to promulgation of federal standards for the interstate waters
within the delinquent state. 17
The water quality standards upon which this system depended focused
on the suitability of each body of water for desired uses. Under the
water quality based method of regulation, the states attempted to tailor
the restrictions ultimately placed upon individual polluters to the physical
characteristics and desired uses of the receiving waters. Pollution dis-
charge was undesirable only if it interfered with other uses of the water.
As a consequence, control requirements varied among dischargers.' s
The results under the 1965 Act were disappointing.'" Fault lay in part
with the inherent technical difficulties of quantifying water quality criteria
and establishing meaningful limitations on discharge.2 0 In designing a
water quality based standard, a state first had to choose a preferred
use-such as recreation, drinking water supply, or irrigation-for the
body of water involved. It was then necessary to determine what charac-
teristics the water must have in order to be suitable for the designated use.
Finally, the water quality goals had to be translated into pollution reduc-
tion requirements, to be allocated among the various dischargers using
the water body. This involved ascertaining the required level of reduction,
the relative responsibility of each discharger, and the effects of possible
future industrial development.2 The complexity of the task led to con-
16 Id. at § 5(a)(1), See Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 682, 715 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
'7 Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903, 907-08 (1965). See Zener, supra note 16, at 715.
1s See Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 903, 907-08 (1965); Zener, supra note 16, at
693-94.
1" See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 1-8, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at
1419-26, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. Npws at 3668-75.
2" The Senate Report preceeding the 1972 Amendments to the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act noted
... the great difficulty associated with establishing reliable and enforceable precise
effluent limitations on the basis of a given stream quality. Water quality standards, in
addition to their deficiencies in relying on the assimilative capacity of receiving waters,
often cannot be translated into effluent limitations-defendable in court tests, because
of the imprecision of models for water quality and the effects of effluents in most
waters.
S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 8, reprinted in LEGIs. HIsT., supra note 5, at 1426, and in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NFWS at 3675.
2 The 1965 Act required that each state adopt "(A) water quality criteria applicable to
interstate waters or portions thereof within such State, and (B) a plan for the implementa-
tion and enforcement of the water quality criteria adopted .... ." Pub. L. No. 89-234,
§ 5(a)(l), 79 Stat. 903, 908 (1965). For descriptions of the processes involved in setting the
required standards, see L. JAFFE & L. TRIBE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 374-75 (1975)
(reprinting Lang, Summary of Federal Water Pollution Control Legislation, unpublished
paper on file at Harvard Law School, 1970); Davis & Glasser, The Discharge Permit Program
Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act f 1972-Improvements of Water Quality Through the
Regulation of Discharges from Industrial Facilities, 2 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 179, 193-94, 199 (1974);
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clusory findings and vague standards of performance.22
Further difficulties under the 1965 Act arose from an inadequate sys-
tem of enforcement. The states delayed in setting and implementing
water quality standards, 23 and federal action was inhibited by elaborate
procedural requirements.2 4 The prolonged process for federal participa-
tion in water pollution control was rarely invoked, 25 and the desired
improvements in water quality failed to materialize. 26
B. The 1972 Amendments
Reacting to the failure of the water quality approach to water pollution
control, Congress adopted an entirely new control strategy in the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972.27 Principal responsibil-
ity for water pollution regulation was shifted from the states to the federal
government. 28 The amendments declared pollution discharge illegal ex-
Hines, Controlling Industrial Water Pollution: Color the Problem Green, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L.
REV. 553, 585-86 (1968); Zener, supra note 16, at 693.
A water quality standard might, for example, limit fecal coliform bacteria to 200 per 100
milliliters of water for swimming, although a higher ratio might be permitted in water
designated for agricultural use. Zener, supra note 16, at 693.
22 See Address by EPA General Counsel John R. 'Quarles, American Bar Association
National Institute (Oct. 26, 1972), reprinted in 3 ENVIR. REp. (BNA) 794 (1972); S. REP. No.
414, supra note 5, at 6-7, reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1424-25, and in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3673-74.
2" S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 8, reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1426, and in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3675; 1 F. GRAD, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW at 2-75 (2d ed.
1978).
24 The Act required that a series of conferences among the polluters and the federal,
regional, and local authorities be held in hopes of conciliation before federal water quality
standards could be imposed. Even then, the governor, of any affected state could appeal the
federally imposed standards, invoking a further process of hearings, before they could be
enforced by civil suit. The suit itself could yield only an injunction requiring prospective
compliance; no penalties could be imposed for past violations. Pub. L. No. 89-234, § 5(a), 79
Stat. 903 (1965). See I F. GRAD, supra note 23, at 2-75; Zener, supra note 16, at 715.
25 See 1 F. GRAD, supra note 23, at 2-75.
26 S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 7, reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1425, and in
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 3674.
27 Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat.
896.
28 Although the Act states that "[i]t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve,
and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and elimi-
nate pollution ...... 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (1976), the statute shifts the ultimate responsibility
for implementation to the federal government. The 1972 legislation gives the Administrator
of the EPA authority to issue binding, nationally uniform effluent limitations that specify the
level of water pollution control applicable to all classes and categories of industrial sources.
See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). The Administrator may
issue the permits through which these limits are enforced, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1) (1976), or
may adopt an approved state permit program, id. § 1342(b). Even if the EPA has delegated
permit responsibilities to a state, it may either veto a state permit, id. § 1342(d)(2), or
withdraw approval of a state permit program when it does not comply with the requirements
of the Act, id. § 1342(c)(3). These provisions give the Administrator ultimate authority for
control of water pollution. See I F. GRAD, supra note 23, at 2-75 to 2-81; R. STEWART &
J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLIcY 505 (2d ed. 1978); Hall, The Control of Toxic
Pollutants Under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 63 IOWA L. REV.
609, 612 (1978).
1980]
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cept as statutorily provided,2 9 and set a goal of eliminating discharge into
navigable waters by 1985.30 The most important step taken by Congress in
1972 was the substitution of technology-oriented 3' "effluent limitations"
for standards based on water quality. Congress abandoned the attempt to
tie pollution control requirements to the suitability of various receiving
waters for desired uses. 32 It required instead that the EPA promulgate
regulations based on the pollution control technology available to pollu-
tion dischargers. 33 These regulations were to take the form of uniform
numerical effluent limitations applicable to classes and categories of in-
dustries.
34
29 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(a) (1976). See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568
F.2d 1369, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
30 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976).
3' For a discussion of the role o( technology-based effluent limitations ill the regulatory
scheme, see notes 76-87 and accompanying text infra.
32 The Senate Committee on Public Works declared that the existing water quality ap-
proach to controlling water pollution "has been inadequate in every vital respect." S. REP.
No. 414, supra note 5, at 7, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at 1425, and in [1972] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3674. The fundamental change in regulatory strategy was
explained as a "change to effluent limits as the best available mechanism to control water
pollution. With effluent limits, the Administrator can require the best control technology; he
need not search for a precise link between pollution and water quality." Id. at 8, reprinted in
LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at 1426, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3675. See
EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 203-04 (1976); American Frozen
Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 115-16 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
Although the federal effluent limitation scheme rests on technology-based standards,
water quality standards retain a supplementary role. Section 303 requires that states establish
ambient water quality standards and programs to implement them within their jurisdictions,
subject to approval by the EPA. 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1976). Sources must comply with state
standards even if those standards prove more exacting than the EPA's effluent guidelines.
Id. § 131 l(b)(1)(C). See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 835 (7th Cir. 1977)
(permits issued by the'EPA must include any more stringent state limitation). Section 302 of
the Act requires the EPA itself to impose special restrictions whenever a discharge that
complies with a technology-based standard nevertheless interferes with the quality of a
particular body of water:
Whenever, in the judgment of the Administrator, discharges of pollutants from a point
source . . .. with the application of effluent limitations required under section
131 1(b)(2) . . . . would interfere with the attainment or maintenance of the water
quality in a specific portion of the navigable waters which shall assure protection of
public water supplies, agricultural and industrial uses, and the protection and propaga-
tion of a balanced population of shellfish, fish and wildlife, and allow recreational
activities in and on the water, effluent limitations . . . for such point source . . . shall be
established which can reasonably be expected to contribute to the attainment or mainte-
nance of such water quality.
33 U.S.C. § 1312(a) (1976).
33 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (1976).'See EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
204 (1976); S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 7-8, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at
1425-26, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3675-76; Zener, supra note 16, at
694.
Although the language of the CWA fails to specify who is to set the effluent limitations
required under this section, the Supreme Court has held that the Administrator of the EPA
may establish industrywide discharge limits by regulation. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977).
3' The EPA has identified 42 industrial categories for regulation. Within each category,
the agency has established effluent standards for each of a number of subcategories. See 40
690,
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The Act set forth criteria for two successive phases of pollution control
requirements. Industrial sources were to have employed the "best practi-
cable control technology" (BPT) by July of 1977.11 A second level of
control, described as the "best available technology economically achiev-
C.F.R. §§ 405-460 (1979). For example, the following limitations have been published for the
by-product coke subcategory of the iron and steel manufacturing point source category:
Effluent limitations
Average of daily
Maximum values for 30
Effluent for any consecutive days
characteristic 1 day shall not exceed-
(Metric units) kg/kkg of product
Ammonia ............ 0.2736 .0912
Cyanide ............. 0.0657 .0219
Oil and Grease ...... 0.0327 .0109
Phenol .............. 0.0045 .0015
TSS ................. 0.1095 .0365
pH .................. Within the range 6.0 to 9.0.
(English units) lb/1000 lb of product
Ammonia ............ 0.2736 .0912
Cyanide ............. 0.0657 .0219
Oil and Grease ...... 0.0327 .0109
Phenol .............. 0.0045 .0015
TSS ................. 0.1095 .0365
pH .................. Within the range 6.0 to 9.0.
Id. § 420.12. An effluent limitation may take one of several forms: it may be expressed as a
concentration (30 mg. TSS per liter of water, id. § 440.22); or in terms of a maximum weight
per day or per unit of production (.0156 TSS per 1000 lb. of product, id. § 420.83); or as a
prohibition (no detectable quantity of elemental phosphorus, id. § 422.22). To formulate its
effluent limitations, the EPA engages private technical consulting firms to perform prelimi-
nary research and recommend effluent restrictions corresponding to the Act's technology
standards. The consultants first study the manufacturing processes and wastewater charac-
teristics of each industry, and isolate appropriate point source subcategories. They next
survey the average and optimum control technologies currently employed in the industry,
with attention to control results, cost, energy requirements, and non-water-related environ-
mental impact. This information is used as a foundation for the determination of the "best
practicable" and "best available" levels of control technology. See EPA Notice, Effluent
Limitations Guidelines and Standards of Performance for New Sources, 38 Fed. Reg.
21,202, 21,203 (1973).
When the EPA has developed tentative effluent limitations reflecting the best practicable
or best available technology levels, it initiates an informal rule-making procedure. Proposed
regulations are published in the Federal Register, followed by a period for public comment
before final limitations are promulgated. See id. at 21,202-06, See generally Gaines, Decision-
making Procedures at the Environmental Protection Agency, 62 IOWA L. REv. 839, 846-64 (1977).
31 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (1976). See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 121 (1977); EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204 n.ll
(1976).
1980]
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able" (BAT), was scheduled to take effect in 1983.36 The Administrator
was directed to identify, in terms of specific pollutants and pollutant
characteristics, the level of effluent reduction which reflected BPT and
BAT for each industrial category and subcategory.3 7 In making this de-
termination, he was to consider a number of factors, such as age and size
of plants, cost of controls, and energy requirements."8 The EPA was not
to mandate the actual control processes each source should use in meeting
effluent limitations; each discharger could use whatever control technol-
ogy it found most effective to achieve compliance with the relevant
effluent limitations.
3 9
Effluent limitations were applied to individual dischargers through a
permit program-the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES). A plant could not emit water pollutants unless it had applied
for and received an NPDES permit. Each permit required compliance
with the EPA effluent limitations established for the industrial class to
which the applicant belonged. The Administrator of the EPA could issue
the permits or could delegate the task to equivalent state programs,
subject to agency review.4 0
36 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(A) (1976). See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S.
112, 121 (1977); EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204 n. 1 (1976).
The Act provides a limited means of modifying the best available technology requirement.
The Administrator can reduce the 1983 BAT requirement for an industrial source which
can demonstrate that the relaxed requirements it proposes reflect the best pollution control
technology it can afford and will "result in reasonable further progress toward the elimina-
tion of the discharge of pollutants." 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(c) (1976).
31 See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(l)(A), (b)(2)(A) (1976). Toxic pollutants are separately regu-
lated. The 1972 Amendments required the Administrator to form a list of toxic pollutants
and to publish special effluent standards for the listed substances which would ensure an
"ample margin of safety." Id. § 1317(a). See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d
62, 73 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 519 F.2d 287, 288
(D.C. Cir. 1975). The Act defines a toxic pollutant as one which "will ... cause death,
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions (in-
cluding malfunctions in reproduction) or physical deformation, in . . .organisms or their
offspring." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1976).
11 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (1976). See text accompanying notes 91-96 infra. For a further
discussion of the cost element of the standard-setting criteria, see text accompanying notes
88-100 infra.
31 See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 59, reprinted in LEGIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1477,
and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3725-26.
40 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (1976). NPDES permits, whether issued by the EPA or by a state,
apply the EPA's effluent limitations to individual dischargers, and contain monitoring re-
quirements and schedules for compliance. See E. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430
U.S. 112, 119-20 (1977) (quoting EPA v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200,
205 (1976)). See generally Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 as
Applied to the Surface Mine in West Virginia-Pollutant Discharge Permit Requirements, 78 W. VA.
L. REv. 213, 222-23 (1975-76). Effluent guidelines expressed in terms of an allowable
poundage of pollutants per unit of production, or per day, are converted into maximum
concentrations which may not be exceeded at any point of discharge. The conversion
depends upon the flow of water from the plant. Each plant applying for a permit must
submit a calculation of its average use of water for each product unit or time period,
depending upon the form of the applicable EPA effluent limitation. The allowable pound-
age is then divided by the water flow figure and a conversion factor to yield a concentration.
Each plant operating under a permit must sample its discharges periodically, and report its
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C. The 1977 Amendments
The Clean Water Act of 1977 retained most of the provisions enacted
in 1972, but created several major exceptions to the strict BAT require-
ment. The most important change was the creation of a new effluent
standard covering almost all of the pollutants and pollutant characteristics
currently regulated by the EPA under the BPT standard.4" The new
standard, which applied to familiar pollutants with easily quantified ef-
fects, 41 was labeled the "best conventional pollutant control technology"
(BCT).43 It was to be at least as stringent as BPT but less stringent than
BAT.
4 4
For pollutants not classified as "conventional" or "toxic," Congress
concentration data to the permit authority, which will reconvert this information into a
poundage figure to ascertain whether the plant is complying with applicable effluent lim-
itations. The permit issuer may occasionally verify the plant's water flow data by field checks.
Interview with Paul Dadak, Environmental Protection Agency, Region I Office, in Boston,
Mass. (Feb. 19, 1980). See American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1060 &
n.74a (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
The procedure preceding issuance of a permit is more formal than that used before
publishing effluent guidelines. The EPA has extended the opportunity for a quasi-
adjudicatory hearing before any NPDES permit becomes final. Because the statute does not
require an evidentiary hearing, the agency has taken the position that the full procedural
requirements of a formal hearing under the Administrative Procedure Act are not invoked.
See Marathon Oil, 8 Envir. Rep.-Cases 1625, 1630-31 (EPA 1975). See also Gaines, supra
note 34, at 841-42.
If an effluent limitation has not been established for the industrial subcategory to which
the source belongs, either because the EPA has delayed issuance or because the guidelines
are involved in litigation, the permit will be based on interim conditions which "the Adminis-
trator determines are necessary to carry out the provisions" of the Act. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1342(a)(1) (1976).
"' S. REP. No. 370, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 42 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs 4326, 4366-67. The 1977 Amendments provide that "conventional pollutants"-
the subjects of the new effluent standards--should at least include "pollutants classified as
biological oxygen demanding [(BOD)], suspended solids, fecal coliform, and pH." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1314(a)(4) (Supp. 11 1978). The EPA has proposed that chemical oxygen demand (COD), oil
and grease, and phosphorus be added to the "conventional" category. 43 Fed. Reg. 37,570,
37,570 (1978). The majority of the EPA's effluent limitations under the 1972 Amendments
had applied only to these seven elements of pollution discharge. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 405-460
(1976_.
42 S. REP. No. 370, supra note 41, at 42, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4366-67.
41 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (b)(2)(E) (Supp. II 1978).
41 In determining BCT standards, the EPA must consider "the reasonableness of the
relationship between the costs of attaining a reduction in effluents and the effluent reduction
benefits derived .... " 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (1976). For BAT, the agency need only
assess "the cost of achieving such effluent reduction," which does not suggest the need for a
cost-benefit analysis. 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
The Conference Committee Report offers a rather elusive explanation of the new BCT
standard:
The cost test for conventional pollutants is a new test. It is expected to result in a
determination of reasonableness which could be somewhat more tlian best practicable
technology or could be somewhat less than best available technology... . The result of
the cost test could be a 1984 requirement which is no more than that which would result
from best practicable technology but also could result in effluent reductions equal to
that [sic] required in application of best available technology.
H. CONy. REP. No. 830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 85 (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 4424, 4460. See note 87 and text accompanying notes 83-85, infra.
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added a provision for waiver of BAT requirements. 45 To qualify, a source
must show that the proposed alternative control level will at least comply
with BPT, will not endanger human health, and will not interfere with the
attainment of water quality suitable for marine wildlife and human recre-
ation. 46 Individual economic hardship, a prerequisite to the only modifica-
tion of BAT available under the 1972 Act,47 need not be shown.48 Finally,
the 1977 amendments extended the deadline for meeting BAT require-
ments from 1983 to 1984.
4
1
In contrast to the above changes, which eased the control requirements
of the 1972 legislation, the 1977 amendments strengthened controls over
toxic pollutants. In addition to preserving the toxic standards provided by
the 1972 Act,50 the amendments required that BAT limitations be es-
tablished for sixty-five named toxic pollutants as well as any substances
subsequently classified as toxic by the Administrator. 1 Congress also
provided that no waiver of any kind could be extended for toxic pollut-
ants.
5 2
In sum, technology-based effluent limitations are presently the major
means of regulating water pollution. Based on studies of the practicability
and availability of pollution control technology, the EPA sets uniform
limitations applicable to classes of industries. BPT requirements have
been in force since 1977; BCT and BAT will be imposed in 1984. These
limitations are applied to specific polluters through a permit system ad-
ministered either by the EPA or the states. As currently structured, the
permit system applies effluent limitations at each discrete point source of
discharge.
45 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (Supp. I1 1978).
41 Id. § 1311(g)(l)(C).
" See note 36 supra.
48 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (Supp. 11 1978).
49 Id. § 1311(b)(2)(F).
50 See note 37 supra.
51 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2)(C) (Supp. 11 1978). The technology-based strategy for regulating
toxics, and the list of 65 toxic pollutants which Congress adopted in 1977, were derived from
a settlement agreement reached in ihe case of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v.
Train, 8 Envir. Rep.-Cases 2120 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd in part on other grounds sub nom.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 561 F.2d 904 (D.C. Cir. 1977). See
Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 101 & n.14 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The EPA had moved very
slowly under § 307(a) of the 1972 Act. It lacked data on the nature and identity of toxic
pollutants and hesitated to impose the strict "ample margin of safety" standard, 33 U.S.C.
§-1917(a)(4) (1976), which left no room for consideration of technological and economic
feasibility. Environmental groups sued to compel action under § 307(a). The resulting
agreement finally put toxic regulation into motion and aided the agency by allowing it to
proceed under the technology-based BAT system. See Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA,
598 F.2d 61, 68-70 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The 1977 toxics program focuses on BAT limitations
but the Administrator retains discretion to impose strict health-based standards for particu-
lar toxic pollutants as originally provided in the 1972 Act. See 598 F.2d at 101-02. The 1972
toxic pollutant provisions are discussed in note 37 supra.
52 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (g)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
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1II. THE NATURE AND ADVANTAGES OF A BUBBLE POLICY
Under a bubble policy, effluent limitations, which currently apply to all
point sources, would be applied to larger industrial units. 3 For example,
in the "Nonferrous Metals Manufacturing" category, aluminum plants
currently may not exceed a certain prescribed level of flouride output at
any one point source.54 Under a bubble approach, the EPA's flouride
effluent limitation would be applied to the entire aluminum plant. As long
as the plant's aggregate fluoride output did not exceed the prescribed
effluent limitation, its fluoride discharges could be allocated among the
plant's various point sources.
The primary advantages of the bubble concept lie in economic
efficiency and flexibility in choice of technology. In contrast to the current
regulatory scheme, a bubble policy would allow a plant operator to ar-
range a mix of pollution control technology based on the relative costs of
controlling pollution at different point sources.5 5 If the costs of meeting a
fluoride limitation were high at some point sources and low at others, the
plant operator could, within the confines of the plant's aggregate effluent
limitation, distribute pollution control techniques among the sources in
the most cost-efficient manner possible. 6 There would be a savings to
'3 See EPA Memoranda, supra note 9; Comment, supra note 10, at 10,027. The EPA's
effluent limitations apply to designated industrial subcategories. See note 34 supra. A plant
may contain only one subcategory or may consist of several separately regulated subcatego-
ries. If the. plant represents a single subcategory, the bubble would be drawn over the entire
plant. If a number of subcategories are present within the plant, the EPA could either limit
the bubble to offsets within subcategories; or, if various of the processes and limitations were
easily comparable, the EPA could designate a larger unit for purposes of bubble trade-offs.
This larger unit could embrace the entire plant.
54 40 C.F.R. §§ 421.22-.23 (1979).
" See EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1659. One economist has described the various
pollution control options available to an industrial source:
Any given situation usually presents a broad range of possibilities for pollution reduc-
tion: changing the type of raw material used, a tering the production process itself,
modifying the characteristics of the product, treating the wastes before they emerge
from the end of the pipe to reduce their polluting characteristics, or sending the
pollutants through the sewer system and paying to have them treated at the municipal
waste-treatment plant. Selecting the appropriate effluent limitation for each firm, in a
way that will produce an efficient and effective overall strategy, depends on balancing
these possibilities against their respective costs, taking into account the economic circum-
stances confronting each firm.
C. SCHULTZ, THE PUBLIC USE OF PRIVATE INTEREST 52 (1977).
Under a bubble policy, an owner could minimize pollution control costs by allocating
discharges among several point sources so that the marginal cost of further reduction is the
same at each source. Assume, for example, that compliance with BAT requirements would
cost more at pipe A than at pipe B and that elimination of discharge at B would be more
expensive than some degree of reduction at A. The owner will achieve maximum economic
efficiency by reducing discharge from pipe B until increased reduction from B is as expen-
sive as reduction at A. At that point, the owner can return to pipe A and employ further
controls there, to produce a net reduction which will comply with BAT.
56 See 44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3742 (1979) (EPA policy statement encouraging use of the
bubble in regulation of existing sources through State Implementation Plans under the
Clean Air Act). The EPA has stated that "[i]f a company can, with equivalent environmental
impact, get S02 out of one process for 50 cents a pound and out of another for $1.00, we
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industry with no net increase in pollution levels. In this way the bubble
policy would result in a more efficient allocation of societal resources.
In addition, a bubble policy would provide industry with an incentive
for innovation.5 7 An aluminum producer seeking to avoid installing new
technology necessary to reach BCT at an outfall that was difficult to
control would have to devise a means of reducing fluoride beyond the
BCT level at another point source. Thus the plant, in pursuing a competi-
tive edge, would contribute to the progress of pollution control technol-
ogy.
IV. LEGALITY OF THE BUBBLE POLICY UNDER THE CWA
If the EPA decides to adopt a bubble policy, it may be called upon to
defend the legality of its action under the Clean Water Act. 8 One possible
should permit the company's engineers to control more of the first process and less of the
second." EPA Memorandum to State Air Program Directors on Applying 'Bubble Concept' in
Implementation Plans, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1635, 1635 (1978).
17 See 44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3741 (1979) (EPA statement recommending bubble policy to
state air pollution control program directors, asserting that bubble would provide economic
incentives for technological innovation).
The Clean Water Act is designed to force continued progress in the development of
pollution control technology. If possible, water piollution is ultimately to be eliminated. 33
U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976). The Act's technology standards are not static; they must be
revised periodically to reflect enlarged capacity for control. Id. § 1311(d).
Industries subject to strict effluent regulations have a natural incentive to develop the least
expensive means of compliance. However, each new technique that lowers cost or reduces
output of pollution increases the industries' capacity for pollution control, and thus invites
the imposition of stricter standards upon periodic review. As a result, the incentive to
innovate is limited to the temporary benefits derived from reduced control costs between the
time when the new technique is employed and the time when effluent standards are revised
by the EPA. Industries have a reason to avoid new technology whenever the costs of stricter
future regulations threaten to outweigh the interim benefits. Although the effects of this
disincentive may depend upon the extent to which the affected industries, rather than
independent, competitive firms specializing in the design and production of pollution con-
trol devices are responsible for innovation, some commentators perceive a serious incentive
problem in the program for pollution control.
The 1983 criteria base effluent limits on "best available technology." But will firms in
polluting industries sponsor research or undertake experimentation to develop a new
means of reducing pollution still further if its very availability will generate new and.
more stringent regulations?
The entire approach provides strong and positive incentives for polluters to use the
legal system to delay progress toward effective cleanup. It forces a central control
agency to make thousands of decisions resting on detailed knowledge it cannot possibly
have and, even less, keep up with over time. And most important, it provides absolutely
no incentives to firms and municipalities to channel technological innovation toward the
efficient reduction of pollution.
C. SCHULTZE, supra note 55, at 53.
The bubble policy would add a new incentive element to the present system. Although the
savings available through a bubble policy, and the new means of pollution reduction that
must be devised for use in offsets, would create a greater control capacity, and, corre-
spondingly, a basis for stricter future standards, the interim benefits available through the
use of a bubble strategy would encourage new research and development of pollution
control technology.
Moreover, the incentive to innovate created by the bubble policy would be different in
character from that created under other portions of the Act. Normally, industry has an
incentive to create cheaper ways of achieving a given level of pollution control. Under the
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statutory obstacle to the adoption of a bubble policy is the use of the term
"point source" in the Act. The EPA will have to demonstrate that setting
effluent limitations for aggregates of point sources can be reconciled with
the statutory language. Further, the EPA will have to show that adopting
a bubble policy comports with the overall objectives and design of the Act.
This latter showing will involve consideration of two elements of the Act:
the role of technology and the role of cost.
A. "Point Sources"
Section 301 of the CWA requires that the effluent limitations estab-
lished by the EPA apply to all "point sources" of pollution.5 9 The Act
defines "point source" in section 502:
The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel,
tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concen-
trated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft,
from which pollutants are or may be discharged. This term does not
include return flows from agriculture.
60
The EPA interprets these sections to require that effluent limitations be
met at each outlet of pollution; the discharge from each "pipe" within a
bubble, there is direct incentive for industry to improve the effectiveness of effluent reduction
as opposed to simply reducing its cost. Improvements could not be avoided at one pipe
unless the operator could produce a reduction beyond BCT or BAT at another. Thus,
industries would be encouraged to develop new methods that were not necessarily less
expensive, but rather more effective. The end result may often be the same, but the
difference in motivation is at least theoretically interesting.
11 Although a full discussion of the scope of judicial review applied to decisions of
administrative agencies is beyond the scope of this Note, it is clear that courts will defer to an
agency's interpretation of its enabling statute when the interpretation is reasonably related to
the purposes Qf the statute and is within the bounds of its authority. See E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1977); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16
(1965). In du Pont, the Supreme Court agreed with the EPA's determination that it had
statutory authority to promulgate single number effluent limitations. 430 U.S. at 134-35.
The Court cited Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 421 U.S. 60 (1975),
which had reviewed challenges to EPA action under the Clean Air Act:
We therefore conclude that the Agency's interpretation ... was "correct," to the extent
that it can be said with complete assurance that any particular interpretation of a
complex statute such as this is the "correct" one. Given this conclusion, as well as the
facts that the Agency is charged with administration of the Act, and that there has
undoubtedly been reliance upon its interpretation by the States and other parties
affected by the Act, we have no doubt whatever that its construction was sufficiently
reasonable to preclude the Court of Appeals from substituting its judgment for that of
the Agency.
430 U.S. at 134-35 (quoting 421 U.S. at 87). See American Meat Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 442,
449-50 (7th Cir. 1975) (citing Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train as bearing on
consideration of EPA interpretation of the Clean Water Act); American Iron and Steel Inst.
v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1041-42 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) (EPA
interpretation of Clean Water Act should be given' considerable deference).
59 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e) (1976). In fact, the Administrator sets effluent limitations for
so-called subcategories of broad industrial point source categories. The process by which
,these limitations are translated into permit requirements for individual point sources is
explained in note 40 supra.
60 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (1976).
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given plant must comply with the agency's regulations for the relevant
industrial subcategory. 61 If the agency were to adopt a bubble policy,
effluent limitations themselves would not be altered; the same numerical
discharge restrictions would continue to apply uniformly within each
industrial subcategory, determined in the same manner,62 and supported
by the same evaluation of costs. 6 3 Only the unit regulated would change;
the limitations would be applied-through the permit program-to a
"plant" rather than a "pipe."
Section 502's definition of point source, combined with section 301's
instruction to apply regulations to these point sources, presents an obvi-
ous impediment to the adoption of a bubble policy. The language of
section 502 refers to specific outfalls; a "plant"-to which bubble regula-
tions would apply-may contain many of the "point sources" described.
Although the EPA cannot alter the congressional definition of "point
source,"
' 64 
an inquiry into the role of the "point source" language in the
81 See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 1977). See also EPA
Memoranda, supra note 9.
82 The process used in setting effluent limitations is described in note 34 supra.
63 The cost aspect of the Act's standards is considered in Part IV(B)(2) of this Note.
6'4 Over the past few years, the EPA has sought to employ a version of the bubble concept
under two separate air pollution control programs mandated by the Clean Air Act. Two
cases that considered challenges to these administrative attempts to implement bubble
policies have established that the agency may not modify a statutory definition to effectuate a
bubble policy. See Alabama Power Co. v. Costle, No. 78-1006, slip op. at 3-6 (D.C. Cir. Dec.
14, 1979) (Wilkey, J., opinion for the court); ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 326-27
(D.C. Cir. 1978).
In 1975, the agency incorporated a bubble policy into its regulation of "new source" air
pollution. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 60.2(d), 60.14(d) (1976); ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 326-27. Later, it
adopted a bubble in connection with the Act's program for prevention of significant deterio-
ration (PSD) of air already purer than the EPA's national standards require. See 40 C.F.R.
§ 51.24(b)(4)-.24(b)(5), 52.21(b)(4) (1978); Alabama Power, No. 78-1006, slip op. at 17-18
(Wilkey, J., opinion for the court). Both regulations were challenged in the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Although the new source bubble was
overturned in ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 326-28, the PSD bubble was upheld in Alabama Power,
slip op. at 19 (Wilkey, J., opinion for the court). The EPA has also encouraged states to use a
third version of the bubble concept as part of their air pollution control programs, see note
56 supra; this bubble has not been judicially challenged.
ASARCO, the first of the two cases to consider the bubble concept, dealt with the EPA's
regulations for new sources, 42 U.S.C. § 7411 (Supp. II 1978). The regulations governing
most existing sources are established by the states through plans designed to achieve national
air quality goals set by the EPA, Id. §§ 7409-7410. New source performance standards, on
the other hand, are strict technology-based regulations set by the EPA. They apply to newly
constructed sources and to existing sources that are modified in ways that increase pollutant
output. Id. § 741 l(a); see 578 F.2d at 322. The new source provisions apply to "stationary
sources" which are defined as "any building, structure, facility, or installation which emits or
may emit any air pollutant." 42 U.S.C. § 741 I(a)(3) (Supp. II 1978).
To implement a bubble under this program, the EPA redefined a "stationary source" as a
"combination" of facilities. 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(d) (1976). In this way, modified outlets could be
excused from the new source standards if the plant's net pollution emission did not increase
because the source to which the standards would apply had been redefined to include an
entire plant. See id. at § 60.14(d).
The D.C. Circuit invalidated the EPA's regulations, holding them inconsistent with the
Act. The court objected to the agency's expansion of the statute's definition of "source" to
include a combination of facilities. 578 F.2d at 326-27. It also felt that the bubble tended to
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statutory design suggests that it was not intended to preclude use of the
bubble concept.
There are two possible meanings for the term "point source" as used in
defeat the Clean Air Act's objective of enhancing air quality by forcing technological innova-
tion. The opinion stated that "the bubble concept ...postpones the time when the best
technology must be employed and at best maintains the present level of emissions." Id. at
328.
In Alabama Power, the same court upheld the EPA's use of a bubble under the prevention
of significant deterioration (PSD) program of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7508_
(Supp. II 1978). The PSD program provides that a "major emitting facility"-which is
defined as a source capable of emitting specified quantities of pollution, id. § 7479(1)-may
not be constructed or modified in a PSD area without a permit which is based on pre-
construction review and imposes a stringent technology-based standard. See id. § 7475(a).
The court rejected an EPA definition of "source," 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.24(b)(4), 52.21(b)(4)
(1978), similar to that which had been invalidated in ASARCO. Alabama Power, No. 78-1006,
slip op. at 2-6 (Wilkey, J., opinion for the court). However, it held that a bubble policy could
be supported by interpreting the statutory definition of "modification"-which turned on
increases in the amount of pollution emitted-to require an increase in net pollution emis-
sion. Id. at 15-18.
The court distinguished ASARCO by stating that "[t]he present EPA regulation allows
offsets within a 'source;' it does not, in light of our decision in this case, allow offsets within
any 'combination of facilities.' Thus it does not suffer from the defect on which the ASARCO
decision turned." Id. at 18-19. The opinion concluded that the PSD program is primarily
concerned with preserving clean air and that the bubble "is precisely suited to preserve air
quality within a framework that allows cost-efficient, flexible planning for industrial expan-
sion and improvement." Id. at 19.
Although the Alabama Power court purported to affirm and distinguish ASARCO, it actu-
ally narrowed the scope and import of the prior decision. Alabama Power emphasized
ASARCO's semantic criticism of the regulatory route chosen by the EPA in adopting the
bubble for new sources, and confined ASARCO's analysis of the Act's purposes to the
particular section of the Act considered in that case-new source standards.
ASARCO and Alabama Power make it clear that the EPA cannot redefine "point source"
under the Clean Water Act in order to implement a bubble policy. Reference to Alabama
Power, however, suggests that if the statutory "point source" language can be interpreted to
permit a bubble, the policy may be adopted if it is consistent with the objectives of the
statute. Beyond this, however, ASARCO and Alabama Power are not helpful in analyzing the
validity of a bubble policy under the Clean Water Act. A bubble policy would operate quite
differently in the context of water pollution control than it has under the Clean Air Act.
The new source and PSD programs considered in ASARCO and Alabama Power, which
impose technology-based emission limitations established directly by the EPA, are exceptions
to the general design of the Clean Air Act. Most existing sources of air pollution are
regulated by the states according to plans that implement national ambient air quality
standards set by the EPA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409-7410 (Supp. 11 1978). See Alabama Power, No.
78-1006, slip op. at 10-11 (Leventhal, J., opinion for the court). Only those existing sources
which are modified in a way that increases pollutant output become subject to the EPA's
technology-based regulations for new sources or for prevention of significant deterioration.
A bubble policy enables modified existing sources to avoid the stringent federal standards
altogether if no net increase occurs within the plant. If a modification is offset by decreases
elsewhere, the plant will escape the EPA's regulations and be subject only to local standards,
as if no modification had occurred at all.
Under the Clean Water Act, the effect of a bubble policy would be significantly different.
All point sources of water pollution are presently subject to the EPA's technology-based
effluent limitations, with or without a bubble policy. The bubble policy would provide an
alternative means of compliance with the BAT and BCT standards established for existing
sources. Each plant would continue to be subject to the uniform national effluent standards
set for its industry, but could submit a plan for apportioning the maximum allowable output
among the various points of discharge within the plant. See generally Comment, supra note
10. The problem of circumvention of federal regulatory programs, which must be considered
1980]
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section 502 of the Act. First, it may have been intended to describe the
units subject to regulation. Under this definition, the EPA would have to
apply an individual effluent limitation to each of the items named in the
definition. If this were the only possible interpretation, there could be no
bubble policy in water pollution control.
A second possibility is that the term "point source" was intended to
differentiate between the types of sources covered by different portions of
the statute. Its only function would then be to limit the scope of the
federal effluent limitations by making a distinction between point and
non-point sources. Under this definition, the term "point source" simply
provides a type of jurisdictional foundation for invocation of EPA
regulations-effluent limitations are to apply only to industries discharg-
ing pollutants through point sources.6" A comment in the 1971 Senate
Report supports this interpretation: "In order to . . . clarify the scope of
the regulatory procedures in the Act the Committee has added a defini-
tion of point source to distinguish between control requirements where
there are specific confined conveyances, such as pipes, and control re-
quirements which are imposed to control runoff.16
The term "non-point source pollution" describes all pollution not intro-
duced to the water through a point source, and includes runoff from
activities such as agriculture or construction 6 7 Because it is difficult to
monitor and control, and may depend upon local geography, non-point
source pollution presents unique problems. 68 Sections 208 and 304(f) of
the Act contain independent provisions for non-point sources which
emphasize long-range research and planning rather than immediate di-
rect regulation.6 9 Congress arguably employed the term "point source"
only to separate the non-point pollution problem from the main regula-
tory provisions of the statute.
in evaluating the bubble policies adopted under the Air Act, is not present under the Water
Act. A bubble policy that provides an alternative means of compliance is less at odds with the
general objective of enhancing environmental quality than is a bubble policy that, in effect,
creates an exemption from federal regulation.
There is also a difference in the control programs to which the policy would apply under
the Air and Water Acts-a difference at least as significant as that between the two air
pollution programs for which the D.C. Circuit reached opposite results in ASARCO and
Alabama Power. Both the new source and PSD programs of the Clean Air Act seek to channel
new industrial construction in a manner consistent with continued progress toward air
purity. In contrast, the BAT and BPT standards of the Clean Water Act are designed to
enhance water quality by improving patterns of waste disposal at existing sources. Logically,
more flexibility is warranted in the regulation of older, less adaptable equipment than in the
case of new construction or modification.
65 One author explains that application of "the standard-setting and permit provisions of
the Act . . . is triggered by the presence of a 'point source.' " Zener, supra note 16, at 766.
66 S. RE p. No. 414, supra note 5, at 78, reprinted in LEGIS. HIsr., supra note 5, at 1496, and
in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS at 3744.
67 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288(b)(2)(F)-(H) & 1314(f) (Supp. 1I 1978). See generally Lazarus,
Nonpoint Source Pollution, 2 HARV. ENVT'L L. REv. 176, 179 (1977).
66 See Lazarus, supra note 67, at 177.
69 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1288, 1314(f) (Supp. 11 1978).
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Throughout the legislative history, members of Congress used the
phrase "point source" in reference to things that could not be termed
individual outfalls. For example, Representative Jones, a member of the
Conference Committee responsible for the final version of the 1972 Act,
stated that "the term 'economic capability' means the economic capability
of the given point source."70
The Supreme Court has also used the term to refer to entire plants. In
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,7 the Court stated that "[i]norganic
chemical manufacturing plants operated by the eight petitioners . . .
discharge various pollutants into the Nation's waters and therefore are
'point sources' within the meaning of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act. 72 It described the Act's provisions for effluent limitations as
identifying "the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the use of
the best practicable or best available technology for a class of plants. '7 3 If
the term "point source" refers to the type of the source rather than to its
unit, these statements are more easily reconciled with the section 502
definition.
The evidence that the section 502 definition was not intended to re-
quire that each pipe or other outfall be individually regulated is not
conclusive in favor of the bubble, however: It only suggests that the
definition was not written with the bubble concept in mind, leaving open
the question whether a bubble is consistent with the statutory scheme.
B. Purpose and Design of the Clean Water Act
The bubble concept is a cost-saving device. It would enable industry to
save money by allocating pollution output among several discharge points.
New control measures could be instituted where they are cheapest, and
easiest to provide, and avoided where they are difficult or expensive.
However, it would necessarily circumvent the application of some possible
controls, and allow some discharges to remain at status quo. A plant
operator, under a bubble policy, may ignore some discharges, or modify
them only slightly, if they can be offset elsewhere within the plant.14
Thus, the bubble concept would not result in maximum implementation
of technology at all point sources. On the other hand, if the primary
concern is with the level of water quality ultimately achieved, the aggregate
amount of pollution added to the water is the same with or without a
bubble policy, and regulations incorporating a bubble policy would fur-
ther improvements in water quality equally as well as the present system.7 5
70 118 CONG. REC. 33750 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Jones) (emphasis added).
7 430 U.S. 112 (1975).
72 Id. at 114-15 (emphasis added).
I d. at 117 (emphasis added).
71 See EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1662; Comment, supra note 10, at 10,027.
,1 Although an unrestricted bubble policy could actually cause some negative water
quality effects, these could be avoided through the use of sufficient safeguards. See Part V B
infra.
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The question, then, is whether a new regulatory approach under the
Clean Water Act can be justified on the grounds that economic efficiency
will be improved without sacrificing water quality. This in turn depends
on the extent to which the most recent changes in the Act move away
from an approach that emphasizes uniform application of pollution con-
trol devices based on the availability of technology, and toward greater
consideration of cost and of the increment of water quality improvement
that would result from application of a given level of technology.
1. The Role of Technology
The 1972 Act made two major changes in water pollution control
strategy. The first was a change in method; the drafters of the 1972 Act
favored a system of technology-based effluent limitations over water qual-
ity standards,7 6 which had proved ineffective under prior legislation. 77
Technology standards fQcus on the capacity of pollution sources to de-
velop controls, rather than on the improvement needed to accommodate
desired water uses. Current engineering possibilities form the basis of
standards which must then be uniformly applied to pollution sources,
even when receiving waters are otherwise pure. 78 The second change was
that the technology-based method of control was accompanied by a new
principle-that all pollution discharge was undesirable. 7 9 Technology was
71 See S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 7-8, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at
1425-26, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 3675; EPA v. State Water Resources
Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976).
77 See notes 19-26 and accompanying text supra.
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. 11 1978); 38 Fed. Reg. 21,202, 21,203 (1973); EPA v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1976); S. REP. No. 414, supra note
5, at 8, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at 1426, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWs at 3675. See generally I F. GRAD, supra note 23, at 2-76 to 2-82.
Both technology-based standards and water quality standards can be used to force techno-
logical innovation. If strict technology-based limitations are imposed, requiring substantial
pollution reduction, industry must develop effective and cost-effective controls. If water
quality is unsatisfactory, a water quality standard also forces innovation by requiring the
discharger to find technology that will accomplish the reduction necessary for satisfactory
water quality. Cost and convenience of applying the necessary control is not considered.
However, a water quality standard requires no innovation unless a specific water problem
has been identified and translated into a reduction requirement.
One commentator has suggested that the choice of technology-based standards over use-
based water quality standards reflects a decision to accord a low priority to the problem of
water pollution. It is argued that technology standards decrease pressure for substantial
technological progress by allowing some consideration of the economic feasibility and avail-
ability of control methods. See La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental Protec-
tion Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 772-74 (1977). Under the Clean Water Act, however,
permit requirements, although based in the first instance on technological capacity, must be
strict enough to maintain minimum water quality levels. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1313 (1976). See
note 32 supra.
19 Section 301 of the Act declared pollution illegal. 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a) (1976). Although
the entire NPDES permit program is an exception to this rule, the declaration did embody a
guiding principle: "this legislation would clearly establish that no one has the right to
pollute-that pollution continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent
right to use the nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of waste." S. REP. No. 414,
supra note 5, at 42, reprinted in LEGIs. HIST., supra note 5, at 1460, and in [1972] U.S. CODE
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to be pursued to the limits of economic capacity, and applied progres-
sively until pollution discharge was completely eliminated."0
The 1977 Amendments retain a technology-oriented method of estab-
lishing control requirements,"' and nominally preserve the goal of no
discharge."2 Yet the 1977 changes signal a broad enough retreat from the
long-range plans set in 1972 to suggest that technology is no longer ar end
in itself. Congress' shift in emphasis surfaces in the senate explanation of
the newly created "best conventional" technology (BCT) level: "The
Committee determined that, in fact, it was possible that the best available
technology requirements might result in the application of excessive con-
trols to certain kinds of conventional pollutants .... 83 To avoid such
"excessive controls," Congress added provisions for relief from BAT
requirements that cover a wide range of pollutants. The new BCT
standard 4 -- less stringent than BAT-applies to all "conventional" pollu-
tants, to which most of the EPA's effluent limitations are directed.8 5 Even
nonconventional pollutants may be eligible for a modification of BAT
requirements under the new waiver provision.8 6 Only toxic pollutants and
nonconventional pollutants that fail to qualify for a waiver remain subject
to BAT standards.
These provisions introduce an element of compromise to the Act
through a significant relaxation of the BAT standard-the maximum
control requirement for existing sources. They reflect a reluctance to
impose requirements for technological improvement where water quality
imperatives are clearly absent. Congress concluded that-in some cases-
incremental water quality benefits would not justify the cost of the best
CONG. & AD. NEWS at 3709. See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Costle, 568 F.2d
1369, 1374-75 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
80 The Act recites that "it is the national goal that discharge of pollutants into the
navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (1976). "No discharge" was
understood to be an aim rather than a binding requirement: "While it is our hope that we
can succeed in eliminating all discharge into our waters by 1985, without unreasonable
impact on the national life, we recognized in this report that too many imponderables exist
... to prescribe this goal today as a legal requirement." 118 CONG. REC. 33749 (1972)
(remarks of Rep. Jones). Nevertheless, the goal was advanced as an important element of the
statute, see E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 116 (1977), and a
plausible ambition. 118 CONG. REC. 33696 (1972) (exhibit of Sen. Muskie). One court
concluded that "[t]he authors of the Act clearly foresaw that its impact would be very costly
to both the public and private sectors and determined to proceed in spite of the cost."
American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 124 (D.C. Cir. 1976). But see notes
89-100 and accompanying text infra.
81 See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (Supp. II 1978).
82 Id. at § 1251(a). The legislative history of the 1977 Amendments recites praise for the
1972 approach: "Little real need for change in the basic structure of the 1972 Act was
justified . . . . [T]he overall thrust and objectives of the program should not be abandoned
... " S. REP. No. 370, supra note 41, at 2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
at 4328.
83 S. REP. No. 370, supra note 41, at 41-42, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4366.
84 See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(b)(2)(E) (Supp. II 1978).
85 See notes 41-44 and accompanying text supra.
86 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (Supp. I1 1978).
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available technology, and expressed a fear of "treatment for the sake of
treatment.""7 A carefully circumscribed bubble policy-which presents a
cost-effective means of attaining uniformly applicable reduction require-
ments without a loss of water quality-comports with this shift in em-
phasis.
2. The Role of Cost
Although some drafters of the 1972 Amendments suggested that the
need for water pollution control should supercede considerations of cost
and should govern all interpretations of the statute, 8 a more realistic
appraisal of the 1972 Amendments indicates that cost considerations play
a considerable role in the regulatory scheme. Expressions of concern over
the economic impacts of the statute run throughout the hearings and
debates that preceded enactment of the 1972 Amendments. Participants
cautioned that the statute must have "[b]alance as well as strength,"8 9 and
17 The Senate Report explains the basis for the new BCT standard:
Many industrial dischargers have testified that the best practicable technology effluent
limitations required in 1977 have provided a high degree of water quality improvement
with the result that BAT requires treatment of conventional pollutants not deemed
necessary to meet the 1983 water quality goals of the act. The intent of this section is to
allow a modification of BAT requirements is [sic] cases where this may be true. In this
way treatment for the sake of treatment would be prevented.
S. REP. No. 370, supra note 41, at 43-44, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
4368. The 1983 water quality goals referred to in the above passage are set out in § 101 of
the Act: "it is the national goal that wherever attainable, an interim goal of water quality
which provides for the protection and propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and
provides for recreation in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983." 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2) (1976).
The Senate Report reference to water quality goals shows that water quality criteria played
a role in the decision to exempt conventional pollutants from BAT. The waiver provision
added in 1977 also emphasizes water quality. BAT may be avoided when a discharge does
not interfere with health, wildlife, or recreation. See 33 U.S.C. § 131 1 (g) (Supp. 11 1978). In
a recent case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit stated that there is
no return to a water quality orientation in the 1977 Amendments. Consolidation Coal Co. v.
Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 245 (4th Cir. 1979). In terms of how effluent limitations are derived,
this is true; the Amendments in no way suggest that effluent limitations should be directly
linked to the quality of receiving waters. Uniform regulations based on technology standards
continue to form the essence of the pollution control system. Congress refers to water quality
only as an indication of the point at which continued escalation of technology requirements
may not be justified.
88 For example, Senator Muskie stated that "the reasonableness of what is 'economically
achievable' should reflect an evaluation of what needs to be done to move toward elimination
of the discharge of pollutants and what is achievable through the application of available
technology-without regard to cost." 118 CONG, REC. 33693 (1972) (exhibit of Sen. Muskie)
(emphasis added). See American Frozen Food Inst. v. Train, 539 F.2d 107, 119-20 (D.C. Cir.
1976). The drafters also indicated that they were aware of the economic burden the Act
would impose upon industry: "In some cases, where industries have done nothing, their
capacity to comply may be stretched to the limit. The Committee recognizes this, and
suggests that to provide opportunity for further delay would only reward polluters who
ignored the requirements of the 1965 Act .... " S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 44,
reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note 5 at 1462, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at
3711.
88 118 CONG. REC. 33754 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Harsha). During hearings before the
House, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors commented at length on the
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that the potential nonenvironmental effects of the enactment should be
carefully considered. 90
The statute reflects a compromise, 9t and recognizes that cost consid-
erations must be one element in setting the technology-based effluent
standards.9 2 In setting the 1977 BPT standards, for example, the EPA
must consider "the total cost of application of technology in relation to the
effluent reduction benefits to be achieved" 93-language indicating that a
cost-benefit comparison must be made. 94 Congress used similar language
when it established the BCT standards in the 1977 Amendments. 95 For
the stricter 1984 BAT standards, although the EPA need not weigh costs
economic impact of the regulatory scheme. He considered technology-based effluent limita-
tion an unsound method of pollution control because
it means a necessary misallocation of our inevitably scarce economic resources.
This is especially true when the stated goal is for the removal of all effluents ....
There should be balance in the attention to the various sources of pollutants. There
should be balance among the various a pproaches to achieving better quality. And the
costs of successive improvements shouldbe balanced against the resources required to
achieve them in order that society's inevitably limited capability to produce makes its full
contribution to national welfare [sic].
Hearings Before the Comm. on Public Works of the House of Representatives on H.R. 11896, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 214 (1971) (statement of Mr. McCracken), reprinted in LEGIs. HisT., supra
note 5, at 1128. For other references to cost in the debates see 118 CONG. REC. 33692-718
(Senate), 33747-767 (House) (1971).
9o See 118 CONG. REC. 33750 (1971) (statement of Rep. Jones). Representative Miller
foresaw a substantial possibility that the Act would result in increased energy requirements:
As a Representative from an Appalachian State, I know that our people certainly do not
want to see more strip mining in our hills to produce the coal to supply the energy that
runs the turbines to generate the current to remove the pollutants from the waters in
our neighboring States. . . . [I]f energy requirements are not taken into account with
respect to the application of technology, we will not have a net environmental gain but
we will end up going around in circles.
Id. at 33764.
"i Representative Grover felt that the Act represented a balanced approach notwithstand-
ing the rhetoric of some of its sponsors:
[Z]ero discharge is really a great PR approach. When you read the Muskie bill closely,
you find that the Muskie bill is fairly consistent with and subject to the problems of
engineering and the problems of cost and the social problems involved, given the broad
language which the administrator will be given to make those determinations.
Hearings Before the Comm. on Public Works of the House of Representatives on H.R. 11896, 92d
Cong., 1 st Sess. 324 (1971) (statement of Rep. Grover), reprinted in LE(is. H iST., supra note 5,
at 1222.
,'2 Courts have acknowledged the Administrator's "statutory duty to consider cost" in
setting effluent standards. See FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 978-79 (4th Cir. 1976). See
also American Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1037 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 922 (1977); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051-52 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
93 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(1)(B) (1976). Total cost includes "those internal, or plant costs
sustained by the owner or operator and those external costs such as potential unemploy-
ment, dislocation, and rural area economic development sustained by the community, area,
or region." 118 CONG. REC. 33750 (1972) (remarks of Rep. Jones).
'4 American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 338-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed, 429 U.S.
967 (1976).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(4)(B) (Supp. 11 1978); H. CONt. REP. No. 830, supra note 44, at'
85, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 4460 (new cost test for BCT reflects
intent that BCT fall somewhere between BPT and BAT in severity).
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against benefits, it must still give consideration to "the cost of achieving
such effluent reduction." 6
In addition to requiring consideration of costs in establishing effluent
standards, the Act also mandates consideration of economic imperatives
in the application of effluent standards to individual sources. The 1984
BAT requirement may be modified "upon a showing by the owner or
operator of such point source ... that such modified requirements ... will
represent the maximum use of technology within the economic capability
of the owner or operator."9 7 Although the Clean Water Act does not
expressly provide for modification of the 1977 BPT requirements, the
Supreme Court has approved 98 an EPA regulation that allows a BPT
', 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b)(2)(B) (1976). This language was held not to require a cost-benefit
comparison in American Paper Inst. v. Train, 543 F.2d 328, 338-39 (D.C. Cir.), cert. dismissed,
429 U.S. 967 (1976). See generally American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1051
(3d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978) ("costs were intended to be given greater
weight in defining [BPT]"). Thus, a cost-benefit comparison seems necessary in setting BPT
or BCT standards, but not in setting BAT standards. It follows that the cost of meeting
technology requirements becomes less important as the higher levels of control-to which the
bubble policy would apply-are imposed. This decreasing statutory role for cost consid-
erations is in spite of the fact that marginal costs are expected to rise sharply as stricter
requirements are imposed:









85 to 90 percent ............................... $ 61 $ 0.7
95 to 99 percent ............................... 119 6.0
100 percent .................................... 317 66.0
Source: Estimates of the Council on Environmental Quality and the Environmental
Protection Agency. In effect the data are in terms of 1971 dollars, since 'no price
inflation has been built into the data. Total costs include a 10-year program of capital
expenditures and 20 to 25 years of operating costs for those facilities.
Hearings Before the Comm. on Public Works of the House of Representatives on H.R. 11896, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 213 (1971) (exhibit of Mr. McCracken), reprinted in LEGis. HIST., supra note
5, at 1127. The phenomenon of increasing marginal cost reinforces the need for a cost-
efficient policy such as the bubble, with its potential for maximizing the amount of pollution
control obtained per dollar expended.
97 33 U.S.C. § 1311(c) (1976).
9' The Court upheld the EPA's approach of setting the BPT and BAT limitations by
regulation, "so long as some allowance is made for variances in individual plants, as EPA has
done by including a variance in its 1977 regulations." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Train, 430 U.S. 112, 128 (1977). See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 844
(7th Cir. 1977). Two circuits have approved the concept of a BPT variance, but, interpreting
the EPA's variance regulation as excluding consideration of cost, have invalidated it as too
restrictive. See Consolidation Coal Co. v. Costle, 604 F.2d 239, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1979);
National Crushed Stone Ass'n, Inc. v. EPA, 601 F.2d 111, 122-24 (4th Cir. 1979), cert.
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variance if certain conditions are met.9 9 This suggests that the Court is
willing-at least in some circumstances-to read the Act broadly when the
practical realities of implementation require added flexibility in the regu-
latory program. 0 0
In summary, Congress intended that substantial expenditures would be
made by industries affected by the CWA. Nevertheless, cost factors form
an important element of the regulatory program and are the basis of
some exceptions to the Act's dynamic technology-forcing design. The
granted, 48 U.S.L.W. 3513 (U.S. Feb. 19, 1980); Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351,
1358-60 (4th Cir. 1976); American Iron and Steel Inst. v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027, 1046 (3d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1978).
a The variance clause provides:
In establishing the limitations set forth in this section, EPA took into account all
information it was able to collect, develop and solicit with respect to factors (such as age
and size of plant, raw materials, manufacturing processes, products produced, treat-
ment technology available, energy requirements and costs) which can affect the industry
subcategorization and effluent levels established. It is, however, possible that data which
would affect these limitations have not been available and, as a result, these limitations
should be adjusted for certain plants in this industry. An individual discharger or othey
interested person may submit evidence . . . that factors relating to the equipment or
facilities involved, the process applied, or other such factors related to such discharger
are fundamentally different from the factors considered in the establishment of the
guidelines .... If such fundamentally different factors are found to exist, the Regional
Administrator or the State shall establish 1or the discharger effluent limitations . . .
either more or less stringent than the limitations established herein, to the extent
dictated by such fundamentally different factors.
See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 434.22 (1979). A variance provision is included in each BPT effluent
limitation promulgated.
'00 These circumstances are clearly limited. In a different portion of the same opinion,
the Court refused to hold that a variance was necessary in regulation of new sources. E.I. du
Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112, 137-38 (1977).
The concept of flexibility in implementation of regulations has also played a role in
decisions involving bubble policies introduced under the Clean Air Act. See Alabama Power
Co. v. Costle, No. 78-1006 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 14, 1979); ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319
(D.C. Cir. 1978). These cases are discussed at note 64 supra. In ASARCO, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia disapproved a bubble policy for the new
source program of the Clean Air Act, in part because it concluded that the EPA had
adequate flexibility in setting standards and did not need the flexibility in implementing them
that the bubble policy would provide. 578 F.2d at 328-29. In Alabama Power, the same court
approved a bubble policy adopted in regulations for prevention of significant deterioration
(PSD), in part because it considered the flexibility argument valid in that regulatory context.
No. 78-1006, slip. op. at 19 (Wilkey, J., opinion for the court).
The varying receptiveness of the courts to arguments based on the need for regulatory
flexibility may reflect their concern for the practical realities of implementation. Both the
BPT variance approved by the Supreme Court and the PSD bubble policy upheld by the
D.C. Circuit provide flexibility in applying pollution control standards to existing sources,
which have fewer options in meeting control requirements and therefore present a better
case for liberal construction of the statutes. In the case of new source standards-for which
the Supreme Court would not allow a variance under the Clean Water Act and the D.C.
Circuit would not allow a bubble policy under the Clean Air Act-the affected facilities can
be designed from the start to incorporate whatever control mechanisms are required, and
thus present a poor case for reading flexibility into the statutes. Although there are other
grounds that may have contributed to the varying decisions in du Pont, ASARCO, and
Alabama Power, the differing practical considerations in regulation of new and existing
sources provide a logical basis for distinguishing between the regulatory programs.
BAT and BCT, to which a bubble policy would apply under the Clean Water Act, are
standards for regulating existing sources. Therefore, they fall within the category of regula-
tions for which flexible implementation policies are most appropriate.
1980]
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bubble policy, as a tool for increasing economic efficiency, is therefore
consistent with congressional concern over the costs of water pollution
control.
V. SHAPING THE POLICY
A. Allocation of Economic Benefits
The bubble policy is generally regarded as favoring industry.', Such a
windfall for industry is not consistent with the purposes and procedures
of the Clean Water Act, and the policy cannot be legitimately adopted
unless it is shaped to, ensure that its benefits flow to society at large. This
can be accomplished through effective use of the Act's provisions for
periodic review of effluent standards. 0 2
Pollution control standards, under the Act, are based on the degree of
technological improvement that can reasonably be expected of industries
in light of their economic and technological capacities. 10 3 The restrictions
that appear in each NPDES permit reflect the level of pollution control
presently achievable. If these restrictions could be met more economically
through the use of bubble-based offsets, the standard of what is ."econom-
ically achievable" would be enlarged. A greater level of reduction could be
accomplished at the cost which the agency has judged to be reasonable
under the Act. In a sense, the bubble would function as a new method of
control-an innovation that would increase industry's cleanup capabilities.
The primary advantage of the bubble policy is that it can be used to
avoid a waste of economic resources-the desired reduction in pollution
can be achieved with less expense. 0 4 Its justification is not private benefit,
but efficient allocation of societal resources. Given the overall statutory
scheme in water pollution control programs-which contemplates pe-
riodic tightening of effluent limitations in response to increasing ability to
control pollution' 05 _the economic savings produced by a bubble policy
must be reallocated to the public in the form of stricter effluent lim-
itations and corresponding improvement in water quality.
This foundation for stricter effluent limitations in the future may
dampen the incentive for innovation that the bubble policy otherwise
provides. However, there would be a hiatus between the creation of new
technological capacities through use of a bubble and the actual promulga-
tion of new, more demanding, effluent regulations. The lag time between
101 See, e.g., Industry Likes EPA's 'Bubble Policy' but Environmentalists Criticize It, 10 ENVIR.
REP. (BNA) 1645-46 (1979).
102 33 U.S.C. § 1311(d) (1976).
103 See id. at § 1314(b) (1976); S. REP. No. 414, supra note 5, at 50-51, reprinted in
LEcIS. HIST., supra note 5, at 1468-69, and in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD, NEWS at
3716-18.
14 See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
105 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(d) (1976). This may be the real significance of the no-discharge
goal-Congress intended that any new technological development for controlling pollution
would be met by a corresponding tightening of control requirements in the future.
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improvements in a specific plant and the reflection of these improvements
in stricter effluent limitations would be of sufficient length to allow dis-
chargers the opportunity to cut back costs. Industries are likely to respond
by developing new controls for use in bubble trade-offs even though
savings would only be temporary. 10 6
B. Minimizing the Hazards of a Bubble Policy
Opponents of the bubble policy have outlined a number of hazards that
could result from its adoption. 7 These problems can be circumvented,
however, by careful drafting of the bubble policy's provisions.
One potential problem is that detecting violations may be more difficult
under the bubble policy; this would pose a threat to the general enforce-
ability of the EPA's effluent limitations.'0 8 Under the current system of
regulation, each outfall within a plant must meet a uniform require-
ment.1 0 9 Under a bubble policy, restrictions on the discharge from each
outfall would no longer be uniform, and monitoring data from an indi-
vidual outfall would therefore prove nothing. Violations could be
confirmed only by measuring the discharges from all outfalls to determine
whether the plant as a whole was exceeding its permitted effluent lim-
itations. Each spot check would require an evaluation of the relative
quantitative contribution of each outfall to the total discharge from the
plant, and of the nature of the pollutants traded.
One viable solution to this problem has been proposed by the EPA for
the bubble policy being implemented by states under the Clean Air Act.
Under this approach, proposed trade-offs are evaluated prior to the
issuance of each bubble-based permit and included in the permit as
specific, enforceable limits on discharges from each outfall.110 These
106 Particularly in times of inflation, the present value of a dollar will always be greater
than its future value, encouraging the production of a dollar of profit today even though it
may result in increased costs or decreased profits in the future. A monopolist who is
protected by high entry barriers will risk raising his or her prices today even though at some
point the increased profit margin will cause new entry and competition in the monopolist's
industry. A producer constrained by the EPA's effluent limitations would be in a position-
analogous to that of the monopolist if a bubble policy is adopted. The utilization of more
sophisticated and cost-efficient technology lays the basis for increased standards at some
point in the future when the EPA reviews and revises its limitations. But the regulated
producer is willing to take the risk of stricter limitations in the future in order to enjoy the
benefit of a dollar saved today. See Hearings, supra note 13, at 102 (testimony of David
Roderick, chairman of U.S. Steel Corp.); 106 (testimony of Richard Schubert, president of
Bethlehem Steel Corp.).
107 See EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1660-63; Concept Papers Outline Approaches for
Applying 'Bubble' to NPDES Permits, 9 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1768-69 (1979); Industry Likes EPA's
'Bubble Policy' but Environmentalists Criticize It, 10 ENVIR. REP. (BNA) 1645-46 (1979).
108 See 44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3743 (1979).
0 See United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 831 (7th Cir. 1977); EPA
Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1660, 1664.
110 This approach was proposed in an EPA policy statement recommending use of a
bubble policy by states in their regulation of sources of air pollution under the Clean Air
Act. The policy statement said:
In order for an alternative emission reduction proposal [bubble policy] to be enforceable
1980]
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numerical limits would allow efficient detection of violations throughout
the life of the permit by sampling the output at each point of discharge
and comparing the results to the figures specified in the permit."t '
Another potential difficulty is the greater administrative burden in the
issuance of permits' t2 that might result from the individualized bubble
designs that would be necessary for each plant desiring to use a bubble.
This problem could be diminished by requiring industries to come for-
ward with their own offset plans, including effluent rates for each point
source. This would properly place the major burden of implementing the
policy on those industries which chose to adopt bubble plans because of
the economic advantages to themselves. The role of the permit authorities
would be limited to reviewing proposed plans." 3 Any inclination of indus-
try to use the application process as a means of delaying 1984 BAT or
BCT requirements could be frustrated by imposing BAT/BCT restrictions
specific limitations on each source must be imposed. Apart from other difficulties, a SIP
[state implementation plan] without specific limitations would be effectively unenforce-
able in most cases since continuous monitoring of a number of different sources would
be required to make sure the total allocation was not exceeded. Accordingly, EPA will
approve alternative proposals only if they contain a specific emissions limit on each
regulated source that is inforceable [sic]. Of course, each limit must have an enforceable
testing requirement associated with it. In general, the new requirements must be at least
as enforceable as the existing requirements.
44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3743 (1979).
ii The EPA's policy statement on state air pollution control plans also provided an
example of an enforceable bubble plan:
The S02 regulation for the Stuart Power Plant of the Dayton Power and Light
Company in Ohio provides an example of how the alternative emission reduction ap-
proach can be used. This SIP regulation contains an alternative set of limitations which
the company may use in lieu of a uniform limitation at each of the four boiler stacks at its
power generating plant. The plant still must meet specific limitations at its individual
stacks, but these imitations are set using an equation that makes the overall emissions
under the emission reduction alternative equal to the amount permitted under the
uniform emissions limit. This flexibility will allow the power plant to apply the least-cost
mix of scrubbing, low-sulfur coal and/or cleaning controls among the facility's four
boilers. In this case a demonstration has been made that differences in emissions from
each of the stack sources will not result in overall differences in ambient air quality
attainment or maintenance.
44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3742 (1979).
Because the bubble would be used as an alternative means of compliance at existing sources,
the above example of how a bubble policy could be implemented and enforced under the
Clean Air Act applies equally to the use of a bubble under the Clean Water Act. However,
because only general requirements for state implementation plans are specifically enumerated
in the Air Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 74 (Supp. 1 1977), the approved use of a bubble in a SIP does
not resolve the question of the legality of the bubble under the Water Act. For a discussion of
this question see Part IV of this Note supra.
i2 See EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1663.
13 See 44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3741 (1979). One-element of the bubble policy proposed for state
air programs is placement of the burden of designing bubble trade-off systems on the
polluters.
It is the regulatee's responsibility to come forward with the alternative control approach.
The regulatee also has the burden to demonstrate satisfactorily that the proposal is
equivalent in pollution reduction, enforceability, and environmental impact to existing
individual process standards. In this way the resource demands on control agencies are
primarily limited to deciding what kind of demonstration is required and reviewing the
results.
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on each point source unless a bubble plan had been submitted and
approved before 1984.14 A plant that waited until the effective im-
plementation date of BAT requirements to submit a bubble proposal, or
submitted an insufficient plan, could not escape BAT/BCT pending final
approval of its proposal.
A third potential difficulty with the bubble policy is that, even though it
would not result in a net increase in pollutant discharge, its use could
have detrimental environmental effects because of the unique characteris-
tics of particular receiving waters. When, under a bubble policy, an opti-
mal control mix has been designed within a plant, outfalls with high
marginal control costs will discharge more of a given pollutant than will
outfalls with low marginal control costs. A necessary incident of a bubble
design is the risk of high concentrations of pollutants in certain areas of
the receiving waters. These temporary high concentrations of a pollutant
could have adverse effects on organisms that live near the point of
discharge or pass through surrounding waters. A highly concentrated
discharge at one outfall may create hazards even though it is offset
elsewhere.
Several safeguards might be applied to lessen this danger. Every point
source should be required to meet the "best practicable technology" stan-
dard, which by now should have been universally achieved.1 15 This re-
quirement will ensure protection of water life and guarantee that there
will be no reduction in water quality. The EPA should also insist on the
quantification of all discharges involved in bubble offsets, and require that
trade-offs occur only among the same or comparable pollutants.1 16 These
safeguards will aid the EPA in deciding whether a particular bubble plan
meets the necessary safety requisites and will also make the detection of
violations more manageable. To avoid any chance of compounding an
existing danger to marine wildlife, offsets should also be prohibited
wherever a state water quality standard has not been attained. 1 7 Finally,
because of the acute dangers of toxic pollutants, they should be excluded
from trade-offs, at least until the precise water quality effects of a bubble
policy are known. 1 '
14 The effective date for BCT implementation isJuly 1, 1984. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(E)
(Supp. 11 1978). BAT is to be applied "not later than 3 years after the date such limitations are
established, or not later than July 1, 1984, whichever is later, but in no case later than July 1,
1987."id. § 1311 (b)(2)(F).
1"5 This BPT "floor" has been proposed within the EPA as a restriction on a bubble policy
under the CWA. See EPA Memoranda, supra note 9, at 1663. Section 3 01(g) of the Act, which
provides for a waiver of BAT requirements if safe water quality conditions are demonstrated,
imposes a minimum requirement of BPT. This principle should carry over to a bubble policy
adopted by the EPA.
"I The EPA has proposed that states impose these conditions on any bubble trade-offs
allowed under air pollution control programs implementing the Clean Air Act. 44 Fed. Reg.
3740, 3742-43 (1979).
.17 See EPA Memoranda, supra, note 9, at 1663; 44 Fed. Reg. 3740, 3742 (1979).
11' Congress has expressed its concern over the dangers of toxic pollutants and its intent
that they be strictly regulated. See S. REP. No. 370, supra note 41, at 44, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
1980]
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Any one of the conditions or safeguards discussed above would limit
the scope of the bubble policy and the benefits to be derived, but all are
appropriate in the absence of a fuller understanding of the potential
consequences of adopting such an approach.
VI. CONCLUSION
A bubble policy permits cost-effective pollution control with no increase
in the amount of pollutants introduced into the water and can provide an
incentive to technological innovation. It does not alter the effluent lim-
itations established for classes of industries.. However, it involves some
compromise in the application of limitations, because it does not require
that the maximum feasible level of technology be employed at each and
every point source.
Whether this compromise satisfies the requirements of the Clean Water
Act depends on two elements of the statute: the role of technology and
the importance of cost considerations. As enacted in 1972, water pollution
legislation required that any technology available at a reasonable cost
should be put to use, without reference to the actual improvement in
water quality that would result. The 1977 Amendments continue the
search for purer water, but suggest that there can be a point at which
technology is excessive, and that technology is no longer an end in itself.
The bubble policy, which permits owners to adjust technology levels at
point sources throughout their plants if net pollution discharge is un-
changed, is in keeping with this evolution in technology-forcing strategy.
The bubble is also supported by the Act's consideration of cost factors,
which play a role in the establishment and the application of effluent
standards. Considering these strands of the Act together, a decision by the
EPA to incorporate a bubble policy would be consistent with the dictates
of the Clean Water Act.
The efficacy of a bubble policy as a regulatory approach to the control
of water pollution will depend upon the contours given it by the EPA.
The bubble policy must be treated as a new, cost-saving control method
and considered accordingly in future reassessments of the level of tech-
nology available to industries at a reasonable cost. Further, until the
bubble's environmental and enforcement problems are fully understood,
all possible safeguards should be employed against the loss of water
quality. If these strictures are observed, a bubble policy promises a better
allocation of societal economic resources by decreasing the overall costs of
a given increment of pollution reduction.
EMILY L. SHERWIN
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4369; Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 62, 73-74
(D.C. Cir. 1979). A provision was added in 1977 establishing that no-waiver provision may be
applied to toxic pollutants. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(1) (Supp. 1 1977).
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